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THE RIGHT OF IINORITY STOCKHOLDERS TO
PREVENT THE DISSOLUTION OF A PROFITABLE
ENTERPRISE
ROBERT A. SPRECHER*
Most states have statutes which provide for the dissolution
of corporate enterprises upon the affirmative vote of a specified
number of stockholders.' However, can minority stockholders
prevent voluntary dissolution of a profitable, going enterprise
by a statutory majority ? The answer, it will be seen, varies from
state to state. In some states the decision of the majority gov-
erns and minority holders are powerless to prevent the dissolu-
tion, while in other states the minority holders call veto all
attempted dissolution of a profitable enterprise despite coin-
pliance by the majority holders with the statutory requisites.
I. RIGHTS OF IA NORITY STOCKIHOLDERS IN GENERAL
In assessing the limits within which majority stockholders
may act without interference and those within which dissenting
minority stockholders may effectively prevent action by the
majority, it is necessary to determine the dividing line between
two fundamental rules of corporate law.
* B.S., 1938, J.D., 1941, Northwestern University; member of the
Chicago Bar; frequent contributor to legal periodicals; author, The
Valuation of Stock in a Closely-Held Corporation for Federal Gift and
Estate Tax Purposes (1943) 31 Ky. L. J. 325.
'The study which follows embraces fifteen states whose courts
have developed the law on the question of the rights of minority
stockholders to prevent the dissolution of profitable enterprises.
The statutes in those states and the vote required are as follows:
ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 10, sec. 105 (two-thirds); CAL. CIV. CODE
(1941) div. 1, pt. 4, tit. 1, ch. 15, sec. 400 (majority); DEL. REV. CODE
(1935) ch. 65, sec. 2071 (two-thirds); ILL. REV. STATS. (1943) ch. 32,
sec. 157.76 (two-thirds); IOWA CODE (1939) sec. 8363 (as provided
for in charter); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1939) sec. 17-3602
(two-thirds); Ky. R. S. (1942) 271.300 (majority); LA. GEN. STAT.
ANN. (Dart, 1939) sec. 1134 (two-thirds); Mo. REV. STAT. (1939)
sec. 5037 (two-thirds); N. H. REV. LAWS (1942) sec. 96 (majority);
N. J. S. A. 14: 13-1 (two-thirds); N. Y. LAWS (Thompson, 1939) sec.
101 (majority of directors); N. C. GEN. STAT. 1943) secs. 55-121 (two-
thirds); TEX. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1387 (four-fifths);
REV. STAT. WASH. ANN. (Remington, 1932) sec. 3834 (two-thirds).
Most statutes require a resolution by the board of directors (and
sometimes a finding that dissolution is "advisable" or "beneficial")
followed by a stockholders' vote.
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(hie of these is that matters of important corporate policy
are entrusted to the majority of the stockholders and not to a
,ourt at the request of a minority stockholder. This rule has
been stated as follows:2
"First, it may be stated, as the result of all the authorities,
that whenever any action of either directors or stockholders is
relied on in a suit by a minority stockholder for the purpose of
invoking the interposition of a court of equity, if the act com-
plained of be neither ultra vires, fraudulent, nor illegal, the
court will refuse its intervention because powerless to grant it,
and will leave all such matters to be disposed of by the majority
of the stockholders in such manner as their interests may dictate,
and their action will be binding on all, whether approved of by
the minority or not."
The other rule is that a majority stockholder stands in a
lidu.iary relation to minority stockholders and, hence, the minor-
ity stockholder can veto the acts of the majority if such acts
constitute a breach of the fiduciary relation. 3
Apparently the dividing- line between majority-rule and
minority-veto has been a wavering one, veering at one time and
lace in favor of the majority, and at another time and place in
favor of the minority.
There has been noted inl some recent cases "an increasing
unwillingness to interfere with the majority at the behest of the
minority, coupled with vigorous expressions as to the obligations
owin". from the majority to the minority " * *. The rule that a
minority stockholder must seek redress within the corporation
before applying to the courts has been reiterated -* "". It seems
entirely warranted to conclude that the favor shown by re-
organization statutes to a majority rule is symptomatic of a
general trend in corporation law and is not confined strictly to
reor'anization problems.4
Certain factors, however, are predictable. It is clear that a
majority of stockholders can dissolve an insolvent or unprofit-
able business, whether a statute so provides or not. In Geddes v.
Shaw v. Davis, 28 Atl. 619, 621 (Ct. App. Md., 1894).
Singer v. Carlisle, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 172, 180 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.,
Spec. Term, N. Y. County, 1940); Wheeler v. Abilene National Bank
Building Co., 159 Fed. 391, 393-4 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908); Jones v.
Missouri-Edison Electric Co., 144 Fed. 765, 771 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906).
'Rohrlich, The New Deal In Corporation Law (1935) 35 COL. L.
Rsv. 1167, 1178-9, 1180
L. J.-2
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Anaconida Copper iing Companiy,5 the Supreme Court of the
United States said:
"When, from any cause, the business of a corporation, not
charged with duties to the public, has proved so unprofitable
that there is no reasonable prospect of conducting the business in
the future without loss, or when the corporation has not, and
cannot obtain, the money necessary to pay its debts and to con-
tinue the business for which it was organized, even though it may
not be insolvent in the commercial sense, the owners of a major-
ity of the capital stock, in their judgment and discretion exer-
cised in good faith, may authorize the sale of all of the property
of the company for an adequate consideration, and distribute
among the stockholders what remains of the proceeds after the
payment of its debts, even over the objection of the owners of
the minority of such stock."
It is equally clear that minority stockholders, can enjoin
any majority action that is fraudulent, illegal, or ultra vires. In
Gamble v. Queens Counvy Water Co.0 the New York Court of
Appeals said:
"I think that where the action of the majority is plainly
a fraud upon, or in other words, is really oppressive, to the
minority shareholders * * * an action may be sustained by one
of the minority shareholders to enjoin the action contem-
plated."
The rule that a majority stockholder stands in a fiduciary
relation to minority stockholders becomes operative only in
certain situations. Mere ownership of a majority or all the stock
of a corporation does not in and of itself spell domination.
Stockholders are not'ipso facto trustees for each other.
7 It is
only when a majority stockholder steps out of his role as a stock-
holder, and acts in the management and conduct of the corpora-
tion, with disregard of the interests of the corporation and of
the minority stockholders that he is said to become a fiduciary
instead of a mere stockholder.8 The cases in which majority
stockholders have been said to stand in a fiduciary relation to
the minority have been cases in which the court was dealing with
a matter of corporate management committed by statute directly
to the stockholders rather than to the directors, or cases in
254 U. S. 590, 594 (1921).
25 N. E. 201, 202 (N. Y. Ct. App., 1890).
Blanstein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co., 31
N. Y. S. (2d) 934, 956 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1st Dept., 1941);
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 123 N. E. 148, 151 (N. Y. Ct.
App., 1919).
' Levy v. American Beverage Corporation, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 517,
525 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1st Dept., 1942).
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which the majority have in fact assumed the management of the
iorporation's property or business, or cases in which the major-
ity have undertaken to act for the minority. 9
Given one of these situations, the next problem is to deter-
Mine what constitutes a breach of the fiduciary relation. A
lominant or controlling stockholder, or group of stockholders,
is a fiduciary whose powers are in trust and whose dealings
with the corporation are subject to vigorous scrutiny, and where
such dealings are challenged, the dominant stockholder must
prove the good faith of the transaction and its inherent fairness
from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein.1 1' A violation of the fiduciary duty of the dominant
stockholder to the minority stockholder is not dependent merely
on fraud or mismanagement," but exists whenever there is bad
faith on the part of, or personal advantage to, the dominant
stockholder, to the detriment of the corporation and those inter-
esteul in it.Y-
Some courts, in measuring the fiduciary obligation of dom-
iiant stockholders, have applied a more or less subjective test
basel merely on the "good faith" of the dominant stock-
holders.': Other courts have applied the more objective test of
looking to the relative advantage to the dominant stockholders
or a particular transaction as opposed to the disadvantage to
the corporation as an entity, and thus holding as immaterial
the subjective good faith of the dominant stockholders.' 4 The
general rule can best be stated as requiring subjective good faith
,i the part of dominant stockholders but also requiring objec-
tive g-ood faith-that is, good faith implied from an examination
(if the results of the transaction.',- However, in cases where a
statute provides a method for voluntary dissolution and the
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 622, 650 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.,
Spec. Term, N. Y. County, 1941).
"Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 306 (1939).
11 Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 492 (1918).
Pepper v. Litton, supra note 10.
"See, for example, Blanstein v. Pan American Petroleum &
Transport Co., supra note 7; Crawford v. Mexican Petroleum Co.,
130 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
" See Overfield v. Pennroad Corporation, 42 F. Supp. 586 (E. D.
Pa., 1941) and further opinion in 48 F. Supp. 1008 (E. D. Pa., 1943);
Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1034, 1038-9.
' Pepper v. Litton, supra note 10.
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statutory method is followed, some courts have held that su,.h
action is conclusive regardless of the majority's motive, in the
absence of actual fraud, while other courts have held that the
minority may enjoin such action if bad faith is shown.
I. RIGHTS OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS IN DISSOLUTION CA.ES
GENERAILY
In Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, the following ap-
pears :] 6
"Where a statute expressly authorizes a majority, or a cer-
tain per cent of the stock over one-half, to voluntarily dissolve
the corporation, the question arises as to whether this power is
absolute as against minority stockholders. That the minority
may complain and prevent the dissolution where it is illegal or
actually fraudulent as against the rights of the minority is un-
doubted. But there remain the border line cases, where, while
perhaps there is no actual legal fraud, yet the dissolution
actually freezes out minority stockholders and is so intended; and
in such cases there is much to be said in behalf of the injured
minority. The general rule is that where a statute confers
power on a majority, or a certain per cent, of the stockholders to
dissolve, the right is absolute, so far as the motives of the major-
ity are concerned, in the absence of actual fraud, and not sub-
ject to judicial review on behalf of minority stockholders. In
other words, where a voluntary dissolution is being effected by
the officers or majority stockholders, pursuant to a statute, it is
only in rare and exceptional instances that it should be stayed
or interfered with by the courts at the instance of minority
stockholders, and it is generally no ground for interference that
the motive prompting the act is reprehensible or malicious, or
that the dissolution seems unwise or improvident, or that the
court may not approve of the motive in dissolving. The policy
and wisdom of the act is held to be a matter of business judg-
ment rather than a question reviewable by the courts, and the
courts will not examine into the affairs of the corporation to
determine whether the action was expedient or wise. Thus, a
question has arisen as to whether a voluntary dissolution, pur-
suant to a statute, by a majority of the stockholders, is valid
where the purpose of the dissolution was to enable the majority
stockholders to acquire the corporate property and continue the
business in their own interest. In most of the decisions on this
point, it has been held that the minority stockholders cannot
complain, although there is an early federal case to the contrary
and also some decisions in the state courts upholding a contrary
principle."
However, in the same section, ,the following statements are
made :17
"But even where the dissolving stockholders act in accord-
ance with the letter of the statute, they must do so in good faith.
The courts should and will interfere at the instance of minority
16 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 8022, pp. 735-6.
1 Id. at 737.
THE RIGHT OF AMINORITY STOCKHOLDERS
stockholders where the dissolution is in bad faith and violates
the rights of minority stockholders, or where it has been induced
by undue influence or is the result of fraud, or, it would seem,
where the dissolution is not intended for the benefit of the cor-
poration or in furtherance of its interests but merely to unjustly
oppress the minority, or any of them, and cause a destruction or
sacrifice of their pecuniary interests or holdings.
"Statutes authorizing a voluntary dissolution on petition of
the managing officers of a corporation should not be construed
so as to permit majority stockholders to force out minority stock-
holders."
And at another place, the following appears:IS
"A minority stockholder may enjoin the majority stock-
holders from proceeding to dissolve the corporation, where the
majority are not acting in good faith."
ALABA-MA
In Waldrop v. Marti, 1 " the majority stockholders voted to
dissolve all imsolvent national bank pursuant to a United States
.statute providing for dissolution. The court denied an in-
jinu-tion sought by minority stockholders, saying
- 2 0
"Defendants represent *the majority stock, and their man-
agement of the bank's affairs is not to be controlled by the courts
on behalf of minority stockholders in the absence of fraud or
gross mismanagement."
The court then held that the fact that a cashier who had em-
bezzled $95,000.00 was appointed by the liquidating committee
to assist it in winding up, did not make the dissolution a fraud-
nlent one.
CALIFORNIA
In Dowauain v. Hydraulic Clutch Co.,21 the directors, act-
iig mnder a statute permitting dissolution upon the payment of
a ,i.rporation's debts, levied an assessment upon the stockhold-
ers for the purpose of paying the corporate debts, dissolved the
,.lrpiiration, and formed a new corporation in another state to
avtiid certain California corporate laws. A bill for an in-
juction by minority stockholders was dismissed on demurrer,
the court stating: 2-
13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 5836, pp. 176-3.
" 188 So. 59 (Ala., 1939).
- Id. at 63.
187 Pac. 1069 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal., 1920).
-'Id. at 1070.
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"The complaint, taking it at its full face value, as we must
in this instance, discloses, we think, not one illegal act on the
part of the officers or directors of the defendant corporation. A
court of equity will not restrain any person from doing that
which the law authorizes that person to do. People v Gold, etc.,
Mining Co., 66 Cal. 155, 4 Pac. 1150. The law which prescribes
the method for incorporating as a corporation (section 285 Civ.
Code) provides also the method of winding up its affairs as
such (section 1227 et seq., Code Civ. Proc.), as well as the actual
process of disincorporation. In order to accomplish the latter
result, it is a legal prerequisite that the debts of the corporation
be paid (section 1228, Code Civ. Proc.), and if necessary, an as-
sessment may be levied for that purpose (section 331, Civ.
Code). When the disincorporation has been accomplished, the
corporation is dead. Obviously, the 'right, title, and interest'
of a dead corporation cannot be transferred anywhere. The fact
that the same individuals who at present comprise the officers
and directors of the defendant corporation may hereafter go to
another state, under the laws of which they may believe more
freedom of action will be given to them, while one may not ap-
prove of that course, still it is a violation of no law, and is but
the exercise of a right guaranteed under the Constitution of the
United States."
DELAWARE
In Allied Chemical &" Dye Corporatioii v. Steel & Tube ('o.
of America,2 3 Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation was a minor-
ity stockholder in Steel & Tube Co. of America. When Steel &
Tube Co. attempted to sell all of its assets to Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Company, Allied Chemical brought suit for an injunction,
alleging fraud. The court discussed the relative rights of the
parties involved, at length, stating :24
"In analyzing the statute, it would, therefore, appear that
the right of the specified majority to sell all the assets, is absolute
insofar as the fact of sale and whether one should be made, is
concerned. Upon the question of terms and conditions, however,
the expediency thereof and whether they are for the best inter-
ests of the corporation must be honestly and in good faith con-
sidered. While it is the right of the majority to practically
desert the corporate venture by selling out its assets, and there-
by, in the case of a highly profitable concern, deprive their
associates of the opportunity to reap gains in the future by con-
tinuing in business, yet this right cannot be exercised except
upon terms and conditions that are fair to the corporation. The
price to be paid, the manner of payment, the terms of credit,
if any, and such like questions, must all meet the test of the
corporation's best interest.
"The majority thus have the power in their hands to impose
their will upon the minority in a matter of very vital concern to
them. That the source of this power is found in a statute, sup-
plies no reason for clothing it with a superior sanctity, or vest-
ing it with the attributes of tyranny. When the power is sought
' 120 Atl. 486 (Ct. Chanc., Del., 1923).
2 4 Id. at 491.
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to be used, therefore, it is competent for any one who conceives
himself aggrieved thereby to invoke the processes of a court of
equity for protection against its oppressive exercise. When
examined by such a court, if it should appear that the power is
used in such a way that it violates any of those fundamental
principles which it is the special province of equity to assert and
protect, its restraining processes will unhesitatingly issue.
"To what head of equity jurisdiction may, then, the com-
plaining stockholder appeal for protection against what he
claims is an inequitable exercise of the power? The require-
ments of the statute and of the certificate of incorporation all
being satisfied, as they are in this case, it will be manifest that
the only ground upon which he can base his claim for relief is
that of fraud. Notwithstanding that the right of the majority
to sell all the assets is given by the statute, yet if the proposed
sale is a fraud on the minority, it cannot stand.
"Before examining the facts adduced by the complainants
for the purpose of showing fraud, it will be in order first to define
the relations which equity will regard as subsisting between
the controlling majority members of the corporation and the
minority. That under certain circumstances these relations are
of a fiduciary character is clear. No one, of course questions
the fiduciary character of the relationship which the directors
bear to the corporation. The same considerations of funda-
mental justice which impose a fiduciary character upon the
relationship of the directors to the stockholders will also impose,
in a proper case, a like character upon the relationship which
the majority of the stockholders bear to the minority. When,
in the conduct of the corporate business, a majority of the voting
power in the corporation join hands in imposing its policy upon
all, it is beyond all reason and contrary, it seems to me, to the
plainest dictates of what is just and right, to take any view
other than that they are to be regarded as having placed upon
themselves the same sort of fiduciary character which the law
impresses upon the directors in their relation to all the stock-
holders. Ordinarily the directors speak for and determine the
policy of the corporation. When the majority of stockholders
do this, they are, for the moment, the corporation. Unless the
majority in such case are to be regarded as owing a duty to the
minority such as is owed by the directors to all, then the
minority are in a situation that exposes them to the grossest
frauds and subjects them to most outrageous wrong.
"Accordingly it has been held that if the majority stock-
holders so use their power to advantage themselves at the ex-
pense of the minority, their conduct in that regard will be
denounced as fraudulent and the minority may obtain appro-
priate relief therefrom upon application to a court of equity.
But the general language by which this rule is stated is not to be
given its widest possible application. For it is not true that
every personal advantage which the majority secures is to be
regarded as vitiating in character. An -examination of the
cases to which special attention is directed by the complainants
in this connection will disclose that the personal advantage
accruing to the majority is in some way derived from, or inti-
mately associated with, the corporate assets themselves."
The court held that there was no fraud insofar as a question of
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personal advantage to the majority holders was concerned,
stating: 25
"My conclusion with respect to this branch of the case is,
that the evidence before me fails to disclose such a peculiar and
personal interest or advantage to be served by the sale as will,
on the principles applicable to the conduct of one who acts in a
fiduciary capacity, taint the proposed transaction with fraud,
either actual or constructive. Whatever advantage is gained is
purely incidental and collateral. This prospect of personal gain,
though not thus to be condemned as fraudulent in character,
may however be very properly regarded when, as will sub-
sequently appear, the fairness and adequacy of the terms of sale
are considered in connection with the present application."
However, the court then went on to consider the adequacy of the
price to be paid upon the sale of the assets and issued a tempo-
rary injunction pending a determination of the true value of
such assets.
ILLINOIS
In Leopold v. Imlad Steamship Co., 6 the Inland Steel Co.
owned the majority of stock in the steamship company. '"hen
the minority stockholders refused to sell their stock to the ma-
jority holders at $700.00 per share, the majority holders pro-
ceeded to call a meeting for the purpose of voting on whether
the corporation should be dissolved. The motive of the majority
stockholders in attempting to dissolve the corporation, as re-
iterated throughout the testimony by directors of Inland Steel
Co., was to freeze out the minority holders. Before the meeting
was called, the minority holders brought a bill for an injunc-
tion, but the court dismissed it as premature since the majority
had done nothing but call the meeting. The case came up
again 2T after the majority had voted to dissolve under a West
Virginia Statute and the corporation had already been dissolved
and the stockholders had been given their pro rata share of the
assets. In this case the minority holders brought a suit for
damages. The court granted damages in the amount of the
"difference between what plaintiffs have received from the sale
of the physical assets and what the stock was really worth as
stock in a going prosperous concern continuing in business."
The court said :2
Id. at 493-4.
82 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
'125 F. (2d) 369 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
Id. 372, 373 and 374.
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"The directors of a corporation represent it and its
stockholders; the majority stockholders of a corporation repre-
sent it and its minority stockholders. The vote of every director
and of every majority stockholder must be directed to and con-
trolled by the guiding question of what is best for the corpora-
tion, for which he is, to all legal intents and purposes, trustee.
In his voting, in his management, he is bound to be whole-
heartedly, earnestly and honestly faithful to his corporation and
its best interests; his own selfish interests must be ignored. If
when he votes he does so against the interest of his company,
against the interest of his minority and in favor of his own
interest, by such selfish action, by omission of fidelity to his own
duty as a trustee, he forfeits approval in a court of equity.
"What defendant might have accomplished under color of
the West Virginia statute was discontinuance of the business.
What it did, was to take through form of a sale, the physical
assets and the entire business of the Steamship Company.
Whether we stamp the happenings as dissolution or with some
other name, equity looks to the essential character and result
to determine whether there has been faithlessness and fraud
upon the part of the fiduciary. However proper a plan may be
legally, a majority stockholder can not, under its color, appro-
priate a business belonging to a corporation to the detriment of
the minority stockholders. The so-called dissolution was a mere
device by means of which defendant appropriated for itself the
transportation business of the Steamship Company to the detri-
ment of plaintiffs. That the source of this power is found in
a statute, supplies no reason for clothing it with a superior sanct-
ity, or vesting it with the attributes of tryanny. Allied Chemical
& Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. 1, 120 A.
486. The books are full of instances of disapproval of such
action. If it be an absorption by the dominant member of all
the r-eturns of the corporate investment, or a sale of the prop-
erty to oneself for an inadequate consideration, or deprivation
by a syndicate formed to freeze out a minority stockholder
through sale and dissolution or if the buyer and seller are the
same, the right of a stockholder to vote becomes a power in
trust when he owns' the majority and assumes and exercises
domination and control over corporate affairs. Such majority
stockholders' vote 'must not be so antagonistic to the corpora-
tion as a whole as to indicate that their interests are wholly out-
side of the interest of the corporation and destructive of the
interests of the minority shareholders.' Thurmond v. Paragon
Colliery Co., 82 W. Va. 49, 95 S. E. 816.
"Furthermore it seems to us that defendant may not be
permitted to say that there were no values other than those of
physical assets. By taking over the assets and by continuing the
prosperous business of its former cestui trust defendant has
removed itself from the place where it is permissible for it to
contend that there is no prosperous business. That there was
value over and above physical assets is perfectly obvious from
the fact that a prosperous business existed and is still being
conducted; that plaintiffs, if they had not been deprived of their
interest, would be still sharing in the returns from that business
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and that at the present time all the profits of such are being
enjoyed by defendant to the total exclusion of plaintiffs."'
IOWA
In Rossig v. State Baiik of Bode,3 ' the majority stockhold-
ers had dissolved the corporation under an Iowa statute. The
Court, in dismissing a bill by the minority stockholders to ob-
tain an interest in the new corporation which purchased the
assets of the old one, said:31
"We do not go into the question for what the sale will be
avoided, because, as the majority had the power to dissolve and
wind up and sell to any one, including itself, no fraud in the
subsequent sale can affect that original power. When the requi-
site vote ordered dissolution, the corporation became ipso facto
dissolved, no matter what the motive that induced the vote.
No actionable wrong can arise from doing by lawful means what
there is lawful right to do."
KANSAS
In Watkins v. National Banik of Law'rence, "32 a national
bank was dissolved by the vote of the majority stockholders in
accordance with a United States statute. A minority holder
brought suit for a receiver. The court, in refusing to appoint a
receiver, stated :33
"The parties who purchase stock in a national bank take
it knowing that two thirds of the stock of the bank may at any
time vote it into liquidation. This right may be exercised al-
though it may be contrary to the wishes and against the interests,
of the owners of the minority of the stock."
The court went on to say that the directors were acting ill good
faith and with reasonable care and diligence in winding up the
business of the bank.
KENTUCKY
In Kirwant v. Parkway Distillery Inc.,
3 4 the majority dis-
solved the corporation under a Kentucky statute because the
minority objected to a sale of the assets of the corporation. The
'Certiorari was denied in 316 U. S. 675 (1942), but in 136 F.
(2d) 876 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943), the court held that the lower court's
valuation of the stock at $2,350.00 per share was excessive and there-
upon reduced it to $1,350.00 per share.
" 165 N. W. 254 (Iowa, 1917).
' Id. at 257.
'2 32 Pac. 914 (Kan., 1893).
z3Id. at 915.
148 S. W. (2d) 720 (Ky. Ct. App., 1941).
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minority holders sought to obtain the book value of their stock
instead of their pro rata share of the funds remaining after the
"ale of the assets. The court sustained a demurrer to the coin-
plaint, stating :3
"It is claimed that the dissolution of Bonnie Bros. corpora-
tion subsequent to the contract of sale of its assets was done for
the purpose of defeating appellants' rights to the book value of
their stock which was more remunerative to them than their
proportionate shares of the assets under a dissolution of the
corporation. Conceding that to be true, yet the stock-
holders when voting strictly as stockholders were still within
their legal rights. In the case of Haldeman v. Haldeman
et al., 176 Ky. 635, 197 S. W. 376, it is pointed out that there is a
radical difference when a stockholder is voting strictly as a
stockholder and when voting as a director. When voting as a
stockholder he has the legal right to vote with a view of his own
benefits and is representing himself only; but, a director repre-
sents all the stockholders in the capacity of trustee for them and
cannot use his office as director for his personal benefit at the
expense of the stockholders.
"To the same effect is Dudley v. Kentucky High School,
72 Ky. 576, 9 Bush 576. However, fraud may be an exception
to these rules, but as we have already stated, no fraud is claimed
or relied on in the case at bar."
LOUISIANA
In Slattery v. Grealer New Orleans Realty & Development
t2 the majority voted to dissolve the corporation in accord-
once with the corporation's charter. The court denied the in-
jum-tion sought by the minority holders to prevent the dissolu-
1iol,1, stating :37
"The petition alleges that the liquidators had no right to
sell the assets of the corporation as a whole and at private sale,
as directed by the stockholders' meeting. There is no law pro-
hibiting a corporation from selling all of its property at private
sale. Leathers' v. Janney, 41 La. Ann. 1120, 6 South. 884, 6
L. R. A. 661; Hancock v. Holbrook, 40 La. Ann. 53, 3 South. 351;
Pringle v. Construction Co., 49 La. Ann. 301, 21 South. 515. In
the absence of legal or charter restrictions, the mode of liquidat-
ing a solvent corporation is necessarily left to the sound discre-
tion of a majority of the stockholders, acting in good faith in
the premises.
"Nothing less than clear proof of fraud and injury, or the
violation of some prohibitory law of the state, would justify the
court in annulling the sale to the Land Company."
MISSOURI
In the case of In Re Dor Run Lead Co.,3 s the St. Joseph
Id. at 723, 724.
55 So. 558 (La., 1911).
7 Id. at 559, 560.
'223 S. W. 600 (Mo., 1920).
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Company, a New York corporation, owned the majority stock in
the Doe Run Lead Co., a Missouri corporation. The majority
holders voted for dissolution of the corporation and for pur-
chase of the dissolved corporation's assets by the St. Joseph Co.
A dissolution proceeding was brought in accordance with the
MAissouri statute and minority stockholders objected to the dis-
solution. The court prohibited the dissolution, and after noting
that "it is frankly stated that the purpose of the majority
stockholders is to effect a consolidation of the Doe Run Lead
Company with the St. Joseph Company" and "the Doe Run
Company seems to be engaged in a prosperous and promising
business," the court said:39
"If two Missouri corporations not engaged 'solely' in manu-
facturing could not lawfully effect a consolidation, then it seems
quite clear on principle that a foreign corporation acting in
concert with a domestic corporation, in a proceeding in our
courts, based upon the provisions of our statutes, cannot do so,
particularly when neither of them is engaged 'solely' in manu-
facturing.
"We think that the statutes relating to the dissolution of
corporations contemplates a dissolution in fact as well as in
name. 'Dissolution' is used in its ordinary sense and meaning,
and is to be so construed. As defined by Webster, 'dissolution'
means, 'act or process of dissolving or breaking up; separation
into component parts; disorganization.' 'Consolidation,' by the
same authority, is 'solidification; combination; strengthening.'
Whether or not a decree of dissolution should be granted in a
given case, then (other requirements of the law being satisfied),
depends upon the simple question of the good faith of the pro-
ceeding, and that is a question to be determined upon the facts
of each particular case. A determination of the question of good
faith does not necessarily involve an inquiry into the motives of
either group of stockholders with reference to the effect of dis-
solution upon themselves or upon the other group. By saying
that the proceeding must be in good faith, we mean that it must
appear upon the face of the record (using that term in its broad
sense) that the suit for dissolution is such a suit as is contem-
plated by our statutes; that is, that the dissolution sought must
be a bona fide dissolution intended to culminate in a cessation of
corporate life and a distribution of corporate assets. Anything
else is a fraud upon the law which the courts will not counten-
ance. If our statutes relating to the consolidation and dissolu-
tion of corporations are not sufficiently elastic to meet the needs
of modern business, relief from that evil must be sought through
new legislation rather than through an erratic and dubious
construction of existing laws. In the case in hand we think
(speaking in legal phraseology, and not as implying moral obli-
quity) that the proceeding is not in good faith. It is an attempt
to use the law of dissolution as a law of consolidation. This can-
not be done. This view has been sustained in other jurisdictions
upon reasoning so terse, lucid, and comprehensive, and upon
"Id. at 611-12.
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facts so closely analogous, that we feel justified in adopting the
arguments as our own, and we therefore quote liberally from
them."
NEW HAMPSHIRE
In Bowditch v. Jackson Co.,4" the court said
4 '
"The main question in this case is whether a going business
corporation can be closed out and dissolved upon the motion of
the majority of its stockholders and against the protest of the
minority. The question is a new one in this state, although it
has frequently been considered (both in cases where it was nec-
essarily involved and those where it was not) by the courts in
other states. The decisions and dicta are conflicting and are
quite evenly divided. In the following cases the existence of
the power is denied, though in most of them the question was
not necessarily involved: Abbot v. Rubber Co., 33 Barb. (N. Y.)
578; People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269, 32 N. E. 54, 17 L. R. A. 737;
Kean v. Johnson, 9 N. J. Eq. 401; Forrester v. Mining Co., 21
Mont. 544, 55 Pac. 229, 353. That the power exists is decided or
declared in other cases. Treadwell v. Company, 7 Gray (Mass.)
393, 66 Am. Dec. 490; Phillips v. Company, 21 R. I. 302, 43 Atl.
598, 45 L. R. A. 560; Black v. Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130, 404
(overruling Kean v. Johnson, 9 N. J. Eq. 401); Merchants', etc.,
Line v. Waganer, 71 Ala. 581; State v. Company, 115 Tenn. 266, 89
S. W. 741, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, 112 Am. St. Rep. 825; Tanner v.
Railway, 180 Mo. 1, 79 S. W. 155, 103 Am. St. Rep. 534; Arents v.
Company (C. C.) 101 Fed. 338.
"The action taken by a majority of the stockholders of the
Jackson Company whereby, as a part of the process of winding
up the company, they voted to sell all its property to the Nashua
Company, was within the power impliedly given to them when
the company was formed. The charges that there was fraud
in the sale and that it was for an inadequate price have been
disproved. Two other causes of complaint remain to be con-
sidered."
NEW JERSEY
In Wiadinillr v. Standard Distilling & Distributing Co.,42
the directors resolved to dissolve the corporation, whereupon
the minority holders brought a bill to enjoin a vote between
stockholders on the question of dissolution. In denying the in-
jimnitimn, the court said :4.
"I have not been referred to any authority which holds
that one stockholder is in any sense a trustee for other stock-
holders, or that he is debarred from voting on his stock accord-
ing to what he may conceive to be his interest, or in a way which
may result in a benefit to himself, and which other stockholders
may not enjoy. Directors, by whomsoever elected, are the re-
presentatives of all the stockholders, and, as such, are charged
with the duty of administering the affairs of the company for
" 82 Atl. 1014 (N. H., 1912).
"Id. at 1016 and 1018.
'-'114 Fed. 491 (C. C., N. J., 1902).
"Id. at 494-5.
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the equal benefit of their cestuis quo trustent. But the doctrine
is new that the stockholders are trustees one for another, or
that an interest of one stockholder, which in the judgment of
another stockholder may seem to be adverse to his own, can
operate to prevent him from voting on his own stock as he sees
fit.
.,The court cannot be called upon to manage the internal
affairs of corporations, or to determine whether this or that
stockholder is disqualified from voting upon one or another
question which may be presented to the stockholders for their
consideration by reason of his own interest. If the directors,
who are the trustees of all, conspire with a few or some of the
stockholders to deprive the others of their property, the court
will interfere to see that justice is done. The court will not per-
mit the directors to divert the business of the corporation so that
a sale and sacrifice of its assets will become obligatory, and the
distribution of the proceeds unequal among its shareholders.
"No case has been brought to the attention of the court
where any stockholder has been deprived of his right to vote on
his stock in such a way as may, in his opinion, best subserve his
own interests.
"In the case at bar the court is not in possession of facts
which would enable them to determine whether the interests
of the corporation, as distinct from the interests of the individual
shareholders, require that it should be dissolved. Under the
general corporation act of the state of New Jersey, any corpora-
tion may be dissolved whenever in the judgment of the board
of directors it shall be deemed advisable and most for the benefit
of such corporation that it should be dissolved; provided that,
at a meeting of the stockholders called for the purpose of passing
upon the propriety of such dissolution, two-thirds in interest of
all the stockholders shall consent thereto. Laws 1896, c. 185.
There is no provision in the law which authorizes the court to
review the judgment of the directors as to the advisability of
dissolution."
In Barretit v. Bloomfield Savings Instit ution, 4 4 a bank was
dissolved by its directors in accordance with a New Jersey stat-
ute. The court, in granting a temporary injunction, said :4
"This brings me to the principal question, and that is:
Have the defendants been guilty of any breach of trust? And
that leads to an examination of the question-which, however,
seems to me really to need no examination-of the real relation
which the managers of this and other savings institutions bear
to the public and to the depositors. And I will say at once,
before citing the authorities, that I had supposed that, if any-
thing was perfectly well settled in New Jersey, it was that the
managers of a savings institution occupied the position of trus-
tees of the depositors; and I think an examination of the authori-
ties shows that their position is of even a higher grade than
that: They are trustees of a public franchise granted to and
held and exercised by them for the benefit of the public at large,
and especially that part of the public in the immediate neigh-
"54 Atl. 543 (Ct. Chanc., N. J., 1903), aff'd. per curiam, 57 Atl.
1131 (N. J. Ct. Err. and App., 1904).
Id. at 546 and 549.
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borhood of the location of the particular institution, as well as for
the depositors in their institution.
"The defendants assert that they are justified in what they
have done by the language of the act of April 9, 1902 (P. L. 1902,
p. 677). That act authorizes them to dissolve the institution,
if, at a meeting of the managers called to consider the question,
'a resolution declaring the dissolution of said institution to be
advisable be passed by a two-thirds vote of the whole board.'
The meaning of the word 'advisable' is sufficiently clear and
simple. That is 'advisable' which is expedient, prudent, and
proper to be done, and therefore proper to be advised to be done.
Its synonyms, according to Webster, Worcester, and the Century
Dictionary, are 'expedient,' 'proper,' 'desirable,' 'prudent,' 'wise,'
'best.' It seems clear to my mind that in the act here in ques-
tion the word 'advisable' includes those qualities as applied to
the continuance of the existence of the defendant corporation in
view of the interests of the public generally, as well as in the
interests of that portion of the public in the immediate neighbor-
hood of Bloomfield. I am unable to conceive that the Legis-
lature intended that the managers, in judging upon and deter-
mining such advisability, should take into consideration their
own individual interests or that of their friends, or even act from
mere indifference, or a desire to be relieved from the duties of
their offices. In my judgment, the only considerations which
the Legislature intended should influence their judgment are the
interests of the public."
In Bijiur v. ,latldard Distilling & Distributing Co.,46 the
-orloration had been dissolved by its stockholders under the
Ncw Jersey statute. Minority preferred stockholders, whose
stock had indorsed on its face a guarantee of dividends for the
entire period for which the corporation was organized, brought
suit for dividends accruing after the dissolution of the corpora-
tion. Prior to the suit the same minority holders had brought a
bill in equity for the appointment of a receiver of the corpora-
tion. The court, in dismissing the bill, said:47
"The rule allowing stockholders of a company the option to
avoid contracts or agreements made by common directors, on
behalf of both companies, and which is applied in proper cases
where the contract, finally binding the company and all its stock-
holders, is made through the directors alone, has no application
to the action of directors in those statutory proceedings where
the final action is that of the stockholders themselves, acting, as
they are entitled to act, in their individual rights, and, if they
choose, according to their individual interests.
"Nor has the charge of fraud in the passage of the resolution
been at all made out. On the contrary, the evidence of the wit-
nesses called by complainant on this hearing to testify in relation
to the passage of the resolution for dissolution disproves the
charge, and on the hearing and in the briefs the evidence mainly
" 70 Atl. 934 (Ct. Chanc., N. J., 1908), aff'd. per curiam, 81 Atl.
1132 (N. J. Ct. Err. and App., 1911).
Id. at 937.
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relied on to support the charge is that of the reports of the several
companies and the financial condition of the company as in-
ferred from these reports. These statements do not justify such
inference. But as to all of the objections to the dissolution of
the Distributing Company, based on the alleged fraud of the
Standard Company as one of the stockholders, acting through
its own directors, I think the complainants are concluded by the
bill and proceedings in their own suit in chancery above set
forth, in which they accepted the dissolution, took proceedings
to carry it into effect, and procured a final decree distributing its
assets among all its stockholders, including as well the Standard
and Distributing Company as themselves. The decree is set
up in the answer as res adjudicata, and it must therefore be given
full effect on all the matters foreclosed by it. The claim of com-
plainants against the Standard. Company, therefore, must depend
upon the contract, and this is the ground upon which the claim
is mainly placed by the bill; the allegation of fraud in the pro-
ceedings for dissolution being set up apparently only as an alter-
native answer or basis of relief, in case the contract be construed
as terminated merely by the dissolution of the Distributing
Company."
In William B. Biker & Son Co., v. United Drug Co.,4 the
directors of the corporation adopted a resolution to dissolve it.
In notifying the stockholders of the calling of a meeting to vote
on dissolution, the directors frankly stated that the disso-
lution was part of a plan for the reorganization of the company
and was meant to accomplish the following results: First, to
provide additional capital; second, to give preferred stockholdors
the option of exchanging preferred stock for common stock; and,
third, the elimination of four subsidiary companies. The plan
contemplated the transfer of all the assets of the corporation to
a new company organized under the laws of Michigan. Before
the stockholders meeting was held, minority stockholders brought
suit to enjoin a vote on dissolution. The court, in denying the
injunction, said:
"The meeting for the purpose of acting upon the first
resolution, relative to dissolution, has been duly called, and the
power and right is expressly given by the statute to the stock-
holders to take action on such resolution and consent to the
dissolution by a two-thirds vote, and consent in writing.
"The stockholders at this meeting act, not as trustees for
each other, but individually, and have the right to vote as their
views of their individual interests may dictate, subject to the
qualification hereafter stated.
"The New Jersey cases settling the nature of the rights of
stockholders at stockholders' meetings are referred to in some
cases that have been before me, especially the Colgate Case, 73
N. J. Eq. 72, 67 Atl. 657, which was a case of consolidation and
merger, and the Bijur Case, 74 N. J. Eq. 546, 70 Atl. 934, a case
s 79 Atl. 1044 (Ct. Chanc., N. J., 1911).
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of dissolution. The latter case is now pending before the Court
of Errors and Appeals, and it is possible some qualifications of
the rights as previously declared may be made. This right to
take action on the resolution for dissolution is conferred by
statute in express terms, without any express terms of qualifica-
tion.
"It is contended on the part of the complainants that there
are provisions in the statutes relating to corporations which have
the effect of qualifying this right. These provisions are those
defining the effect of dissolution and directing the proceedings
that are to be taken for winding up on dissolution. It is con-
tended that those have the effect of qualifying this power, and
that cn a proposed dissolution the court may examine whether,
in reference to the steps intended to be taken, they are such as
are directed or intended by the statute, and, if not, may enjoin
the entire proceedings for dissolution, including a vote on the
resolution. I think that is a wrong view of the effect of those
provisions. Those provisions are effective; but they are not
effective by way of qualifying the right to dissolution. They are
effective by way of preventing any plan being carried out sub-
sequent to the dissolution which is not in compliance with the
terms of the statute; but the court should not undertake in ad-
vance to say that the right to vote on the question of dissolution
must be taken away, for the reason that in voting on this ques-
tion they do so with the motive, or the object, of carrying out
certain plans which would be in violation of the statute relating
to proceedings after dissolution. For if the plans are violations
of the statute, they cannot be carried out after dissolution, and
the stockholders, in voting to dissolve, take that risk of their
being carried out.
"I conclude, therefore, that these other provisions of the
corporation act relating to the effect of dissolution and the
proceedings on dissolution have not the effect of qualifying the
right or power of a stockholder to vote on the resolution for dis-
solution. It is undoubtedly true that the dissolution could not be
used by the majority for the purpose of committing a fraud on
the minority stockholders, but in the absence of fraud, or acts
beyond their lawful powers as stockholders, the minority have,
as I think, no standing to enjoin the exercise of this right con-
ferred by statute on the majority stockholders.
"The circumstance that one motive or reason for the dis-
solution of the company may be a termination of rights given
by a by-law of the company to the stockholders does not of itself
make the proceedings for dissolution a fraud on the minority
stockholders. It is often found, in the organization of com-
panies, that provisions are adopted either by way of express con-
tracts in the stock itself, or in the by-laws, that operate in a way
far different from what the promoters or original organizers of
the company expected, and in many cases it is a matter of pure
business reason and judgment, not at all involving any question
of fraud, whether the company should consider the advisability,
in a business point of view, of taking into account, in the dissolu-
tion of the company, the termination of contracts, leaving the
assets of the company subject to any liability therefor. In the
Bijur Case, as I recall it, one of the reasons mostly relied on for
a dissolution of one of the companies was that, in its original
charter or contracts made under it, there had been provisions
for contracts of such an onerous character that, if carried out, it
1'. 3-3:
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eventually must injure the business of the company materially.
So far, therefore, as it is a business reason, the stockholders
have a right to consider the effect of the by-law and its contin-
uance. The circular does not state expressly that the termina-
tion of this by-law is one of the objects of the plan of reorgani-
zation; but I think, in view of the fact that the Massachusetts
company is organized on a plan by which the by-law is omitted,
the complainants as well as the defendant in this case are en-
titled to consider the elimination of this by-law as one change
in the status of the company in the reorganization of its affairs
proposed. My view in reference to the right to terminate rights
conferred by a by-law is that the by-law, considered merely as
such, is made subject to determination by dissolution of the
company, under the laws that were in force at its adoption.
"The fact that the dissolution is recommended by the direc-
tors, or may be intended by the majority stockholders in giving
consent to it, as one step in a proceeding to reorganize the finan-
cial and business affairs of the company, does not of itself make
the proceedings either fraudulent or colorable under the statute.
"On the affidavits in this case as presented to me, it cannot
be said that they disclose merely a colorable dissolution or plan
of reorganization."
The above case was later reversed 5u on the sole ground that
the proposed dissolution was in reality a consolidation of the
New Jersey and Massachusetts corporations, and since the New
Jersey law did not permit a consolidation of the merger of a
domestic and a foreign corporation, the court permitted an in-
junction to be issued, stating: 51
"Manifestly the prime purpose of the scheme outlined in
this communication is not the winding up of the New Jersey cor-
poration and the distribution of its assets, or the proceeds of the
sale thereof, among its stockholders, but the absorption of that
company by the Massachusetts corporation, the transfer, not only
of its assets, but of its business, to that corporation, and the
future carrying on of that business by the Massachusetts cor-
poration under the name of the defendant company. The
scheme, in its essence, whatever it,may be in form, is not a plan
for the reorganization of the New Jersey company, nor even for
the winding up of its business and its dissolution, within the
meaning of the latter word as used by our Corporation Act, but
is a scheme for its merger into or consolidation with the Massa-
chusetts corporation. State v. Atlantic City & Shore R. R. Co.,
77 N. J. Law 466, 483, 72 Atl. 111.
"Consequently the fundamental question now to be decided
is whether a corporation of this state, organized under our gen-
eral Corporation Act, may legally be merged into or consolidated
with a corporation created by and organized under the laws of a
sister state. The answer to this question seems to us not to be
in doubt. As was said by this court in Colgate v. United States
Leather Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 229, 72 Atl. 126, 19 Ann Cas. 1262, the
power of corporations to consolidate and merge is not to be
0 Id. at 1045-6.
82 Atl. 930 (N. J. Ct. Err. and App., 1912).
Id. at 931.
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implied, and exists only by virtue of plain legislative enactment;
and no statute of our state can be found which authorizes the
proposed scheme.
"The only right given by our Legislature to two or more
corporations to merge or consolidate into a single corporation is
expressly limited to those which are organized under the laws
of our own state. Revised Corporation Act, § 104 (P. L. 1896,
p. 309). The proposed plan for the so-called 'reorganization' of
the defendant company is therefore in violation of the law of the
state, whose creature it is; and, this being so, any stockholder
who refuses to consent thereto is entitled to the aid of a court
of equity to prevent its being carried into execution. Each
stockholder of the company owns a share in its property and
assets, and is entitled to have a proportionate share in its profits.
They have invested their capital in it, and in it alone; and they
are entitled to every dollar that it earns. This is the agreement
of the stockholders among themselves. They each contract with
the other that their money shall be employed for the purposes
specified in the certificate of incorporation, and for no other
purpose, and that the profits of the enterprise shall be ratably
apportioned among them. In the absence of legislation permit-
ting a variation of the provisions of this fundamental contract
by vote of a majority of the stockholders, no majority, however
large, has a right to divert any part of the joint capital, however
small, to any purpose not consistent with and growing out of this
original, fundamental agreement. Black v. Delaware & Raritan
Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 456, 463; Mills v. Central R. R. Co. of
N. J., 41 N. J. Eq. 1, 2 Atl. 453; Colgate v. United States Leather
Co., supra.
"The scheme in the carrying out of which the dissolution
of the company is a proposed step, is a fraud upon the statute
(the word is used in a legal, not a moral, sense); and every act
done in furtherance thereof, no matter whether it be legal,
standing alone, or not, is equally a fraud upon the statute. This
being so, the complainants were entitled to an injunction to re-
strain the proposed invasion of their rights under the contract
of incorporation as soon as it was made manifest that such
invasion was in fact contemplated."
In Reade v. Broadway Theatre Co., of Long Branch,5 2 in a
suit by an owner of about one-half of the corporate stock for the
appointment of a receiver on the ground that the executors of an
estate which owned the other half of the corporate stock refused
to sell such interest to him, the court, in dismissing the Action,
"A voluntary dissolution may be had only in the method
prescribed by statute, or, if through the courts, where it appears
for the best interests of the stockholders and creditors; but a
court of equity will not permit the dissolution of a corporation
even on application of the majority of the stockholders 'where
such dissolution would constitute a fraud on the minority."
- 132 Atl. 477 (Ct. Chanc., N. J., 1926).
" Id. at 480.
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In Beach v. Whartoni Miig Co.,5 the corporation was
dissolved under the New Jersey statute and its assets were s"ld
to a new corporation organized by a creditor of the old corpora-
tion. A suit for the determination of minority stockholders'
rights in the property of the old corporation held by the new one
was dismissed, the court saying r5
"Appellant argues that the whole procedure by which the
property was sold to the Wharton Mining Company was a fraud
upon the statute under which the trustees in dissolution were
winding up the affairs of the Hoff Co.; that Arend's and not the
corporation's interest was alone considered. The Vice Chancel-
lor did not find, nor do we find any fraud upon the statute, or
otherwise. As to the main issue involved in this case, namely,
whether there was any consideration for the conveyance, the
Vice Chancellor found against complainant. With this finding
we are in accord.
"The testimony shows that the dissolution of the Hoff Co.
was accomplished in strict accordance with Section 31 of the
Corporation Act, Comp. Stat. 1910, p. 1619, N. J. S. A. 14:13-1.
While it is true that Arend might have brought suit to foreclose
his mortgages or have sought the benefit of Section 65 and 66 of
said Corporation Act, N. J. S. A. 14:14-3, 14:14-4, 14:14-5,
14:14-7, yet neither of these proceedings was mandatory and
under neither of them would appellant have been in any better
position than upon dissolution of the Hoff Co. under its directors.
In fact, costs and fees were saved thereby."
NEW YORK
In Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co.,-" the majority dis-
solved a corporation in accordance with an Oregon statute and
transferred its assets to a new corporation. The court gave the
minority holders an equitable lien on the property of the old
corporation in the hands of the new corporation, stating': 7
"They never contemplated winding up the business of the
old company, and distributing the assets among its stockholders,
otherwise than as a formal mode of doing what they could not
do by legal sanction. What they intended to do, and what they
practically did, was to effect a consolidation of the old company
with the new, using as the means for the end the statutory
power which authorizes a majority of stockholders to dissolve
the corporation, settle its business, and dispose of its property.
"Plainly, the defendants have assumed to exercise a power
belonging to the majority, in order to secure personal profit for
themselves, without regard to the interests of the minority.
They repudiate the suggestion of fraud, and plant themselves
upon their right as a majority to control the corporate interests
15 A. (2d) 605 (N. J. Ct. Err. and App., 1940).
Id. at 607.
"27 Fed. 625 (C. C., N. Y., 1886).
Id. at 629, 630-1.
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according to their discretion. They err if they suppose that
a court of equity will tolerate a discretion which does not con-
sult the interests of the minority.
"It cannot be denied that minority stockholders are bound
hand and foot to the majority in all matters of legitimate admin-
istration of the corporate affairs; and the courts are powerless
to redress many forms of oppression practiced upon the minority
under the guise of legal sanction, which fall short of actual
fraud. This is a consequence of the implied contract of associa-
tion, by which it is agreed, in advance, that a majority shall bind
the whole body as to all transactions within the scope of the
corporate powers. But it is also of the essence of the contract
that the corporate powers shall only be exercised to accomplish
the objects for which they were called into existence, and that
the majority shall not control those powers to prevent or destroy
the original purposes of the corporators. * : * It is for this
reason that the majority cannot consolidate the corporation with
another corporation, and impose responsibilities and hazards
upon the minority not contemplated by the original enterprise,
unless express statutory authority fot this purpose is conferred
upon the majority. It is no more repugnant to the purposes of
the association to permit the majority to merge and consolidate
the corporation with another corporation than it is to permit
them to dissolve it, and abandon the enterprise for which it is
created, when no reasons of expediency require this to be done.
A dissolution under such circumstances is an abuse of the powers
delegated to the majority. It is no less a wrong because accom-
plished by the agency of legal forms."
In Elbogr'n v. Gthrbereux-Flyna Co., the majority dis-
,ulrcd the corporation under statutory authority. The court,
in a brief opinion, denied an injunction by the minority stock-
h,)lders on the ground that no fraud had been shown.
In Kickerbocker v. Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co.,59 the ma-
jority dissolved a corporation under a New York statute. The
iuimrity stockholders brought suit for an involuntary dissolu-
tion of the company. The court held that the complaint did not
state a cause of action, stating :60
"The further allegation as to the purpose for which these
proceedings were instituted is not the allegation of a fact which
justifies a judgment declaring them void. The mere motive of
the directors in instituting proceedings is entirely immaterial.
If the proceeding was conducted according to the statute, if the
steps required by the statute to dissolve the corporation were
taken, and the corporation thereby became dissolved, certainly
the proceedings cannot be vacated because the plaintiff alleges
that the motives of the directors were fraudulent. I think,
therefore, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action."
64 N. Y. S. 1 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1900).
97 N. Y. S. 595 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1906).
."Id. at 599.
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In Colby v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York,' 1 the court,
in denying an injunction sought by the minority holders where
the majority holders had voted for a 'merger under statutory
authority, said :6
"If a large majority of the stockholders of the Equitable
Company deemed it for their respective interests to liquidate the
company, and proceedings in good faith were about to be taken
in accordance with the statute for that purpose, no one, I take
it, would seriously contend that a court of equity ought to inter-
fere and prevent such liquidation."
In the case of In Re Rateau Sales Co.,"'. an order for the
voluntary dissolution by the majority under statutory authoriza-
tion of a corporation was reversed by the court because the
referee failed to give the minority stockholders an opportunity to
prove that the majority stockholders were dissolving the corpora-
tion to wreck it and to avoid the performance of valuable von-
tracts which it had. The court said:64
" - * 4 but all the papers taken together constituted legiti-
mate evidence bearing upon the question whether it was 'bene-
ficial to the interests of the stockholders that the corporation
should be dissolved.' Gen. Corp. Law (L. 1909, c. 28; Cons.
Laws, c. 23) § 170. Upon this question the interests of the
minority stockholders, as well as those of the majority, are
entitled to be considered."
One of the leading cases in the field of minority rights in
dissolution is Kavanaugh v. Kavanazugh Knitting Co.,S. Sev-
eral members of a family corporation desired to oust one of the
members of the family, who was the vice president of the corpora"
tion. In order to do this, the by-laws were amended to provide
that a majority, instead of all, of the directors should constitute
a quorum at any meeting and to provide that the directors by a
majority vote could remove any officer of the company either
with or without cause. The vice president was thereupon forced
to resign. After his resignation, the directors adopted a resolu-
tion fixing each of their salaries at 20 per cent of the profits of
the corporation. The compensation so voted was clearly unfair
and unreasonable, and enormously greater than was paid for
"1 108 N. Y. S. 978 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1908), aff'd. per curiam,
84 N. E. 1111 (N. Y. Ct. App., 1908).
Id. at 984.
94 N. E. 869 (N. Y. Ct. App., 1911).
Id. at 871.
123 N. E. 148 (N. Y. Ct. App., 1919).
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similar services by imilar corporations. Thereupon the ousted
ijiember brought an action to enjoin the payment of the com-
jvicsation so voted. In response to this suit, the directors voted
to dissolve the corporation under a New York law which' per-
Ilitted suc.h dissolution by the majority of the stockholders upon
-1 resolutioi by the directors that it is "in their opinion advisable
to dissolve such corporation.' Thereupon the ousted member
sought to enjoin the majority from dissolving the corporation.
The court held that the complaint for an injunction stated a
c.ause of ac-tion. The court said: 1,
"The resolution of the board of directors, in order that it
be legal, must be the embodiment in language of the opinion or
judgment of the board, attained in good faith and through
honest intention and endeavor, that, having in view the welfare
and advantage of the corporation and the stockholders generally,
it is wise and expedient that the corporation be forthwith dis-
solved. The unwisdom or incorrectness of the opinion or judg-
ment does not affect its validity or integrity. The fact that the
dissolution may not be beneficial or may be injurious to a stock-
holder or stockholders because of reasons or facts not common to
the stockholders generally need not be considered by the direc-
tors. The law, as well as ordinary justice and sound business
policy, requires that the existence of the corporation should not
be attacked, within the period fixed by its charter, by its board of
directors acting in bad faith, fraudulently, or through the intent
to punish or oppress a stockholder because he defends himself
in the courts or otherwise against their illegal and unfair acts
relative to the corporation or because of any other reason.
"The section 221 imposes upon the stockholders the ultimate
determination of the important question whether or not the
corporation shall be dissolved forthwith. The stockholders are
bound to determine and control this particular part of the corpo-
rate affairs, in regard to which they occupy a relation of trust
as between themselves and the corporation, and are burdened
and restricted by fiduciary obligations. When a number of
stockholders constitute themselves, or are by the law constituted,
the managers of corporate affairs or interests, they stand in
much the same attitude towards the other or minority stock-
holders that the directors sustain generally towards all the stock-
holders, and the law requires of them the utmost good faith.
;... ::* In taking corporate action under the statute, the stock-
holders are acting for the corporation and for each other, and
they cannot use their corporate power in bad faith or for their
individual advantage or purpose.
"A court of equity will protect a minority stockholder
against the acts or threatened acts of the board of directors or
of the managing stockholders of the corporation, which violate
the fiduciary relation and are directly injurious to the stock-
holders. The statute empowered the directors and stockholders,
under the prescribed procedure, to dissolve the corporation.
The plaintiff took his stock subject to the provisions of the stat-
"Id. at 151-2.
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ute. Judicial authority does not extend to enjoining the exercise
of a right conferred by legislative authority. The courts cannot
pass upon the question of the expediency of the dissolution; for
that is the very question which the Legislature has authorized
the board of directors and the stockholders to decide. They can,
however, and will, whenever the facts presented to them in the
appropriate action demand, inflexibly uphold and enforce, in
accordance with established equitable principles, the obligations
of the fiduciary relation. The good faith of the individual de-
fendants is a proper and fundamental subject to be adjudged.
Bad faith, fraud, or other breach of trust constitutes a foundation
for equitable relief.
"The respondents argue that the complaint fails to state
a cause of action because it fails to state facts composing fraud
on the part of the directors. In this they err. It is apparent
that the cause of action sought to be alleged has not as a con-
stituent deceit or actual fraud practiced and effected by the
board of directors in regard to the corporation by which the
plaintiff is to be wronged. The plaintiff's complaint is that the
individual defendants who were the board of directors did not
form the opinion that it was advisable to dissolve the corporation
forthwith in good faith and through honest intention and en-
deavor. We need not state a detailed analysis of the contents
of the complaint. Obviously, facts are alleged which permit,
if they do not compel, the inference that the directors conceived
and progressed the scheme of dissolving the corporation, irre-
spective of the welfare or advantage of the corporation and of
any cause or reason related to its condition or future, through
the desire and determination to take from the corporation and to
secure to themselves the corporate business freed from inter-
ference or participation on the part of the plaintiff. Moreover,
allegations of the complaint are, in effect, that the judgment or
opinion of the directors was not honest, their action was not the
directors was not honest, their action was not the result of good
faith, the exercise of an honest judgment, and an honest and
unbiased consideration of any fact or circumstances affecting the
general interests of the corporation and of all of its stockholders,
and was in bad faith and for the sole purpose of permitting the
individual defendants Kavanaugh to dissolve the corporation
for the purpose of depreciating the value of the corporate prop-
erty and the plaintiff's proportionate interest therein. Those
allegations are matters of fact. Good faith or bad faith as the
guide or the test of fiduciary conduct is a state or condition
of mind-a fact-which can be proved or judged only through
evidence. The intent or unconscientious indifference is the
vitality of each."
In Major v. American Malt & Grain Co.,7 the majority
stockholders voted to dissolve the corporation under a New
Jersey statute. A minority holder brought an action which the
court held to be sufficient to entitle him to an accounting, but
the court went on to hold that he had no right to bring a rep-
I181 N. Y. S. 152 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, Kings County, 1920).
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resentative action without making the liquidating trustees par-
ties to such action. The court said:68
"These individual defendants by virtue of their voting
power were in the same position as majority stockholders. They
could use that power for the good or evil of the corporate interest
and that of the stockholders. It seems to me they may be
held just as accountable as if they actually owned the stock.
Courts will not interfere with the power belonging to majority
stockholders to pass upon the advisability of a dissolution. But
the majority interests occupy a fiduciary relation toward the
corporation and the other stockholders, and are required to
exercise the utmost good faith, which is a subject for considera-
tion by a court of equity. Relief can be found in equity for
their bad faith, fraud, or other breach of trust. Kavanaugh v.
Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148. This
complaint shows that the individual defendants in violation of
their quasi trust duty have placed the plant, other properties,
and good will of the New Jersey corporation in the hands of the
Delaware corporation, without any payment for that good will;
they practically made a Delaware corporation out of the New
Jersey corporation, to the exclusion of the common stockholders.
All this was done, not for the best interests of the New Jersey
corporation or its stockholders, but was solely and only for the
uses and purposes of all of the defendants."
In St. Johin of Vizzii v. Cauallo,69 the court held that the
by-laws of a corporation to the effect that the corporation would
-ontinue in existence as long as ten members desired it are not
superseded by a New York statute permitting dissolution by the
rote of the holders of two-thirds of the stock and also held that a
two-thirds vote to dissolve was thus ineffective. The court said :70
"Moreover, even acting in accordance with the letter of the
statute the two-thirds majority must act in the utmost good
faith * : * and it is extremely doubtful whether their conduct
to the minority displays such good faith."
In the case of Iii Re Amierican Telegraph anid Cable Co.,71
the majority voted to dissolve the corporation. In the subse-
quent court proceedings to dissolve, the court ordered the dis-
solution only on the condition that the corporation retain enough
funds for payment to the minority stockholders in the event that
the sale price of the assets would be held to be inadequate. The
voult said :7-'
"Here, however, the transaction was approved by a large
majority of the stockholders, including such a majority of those
"Id. at 153-4
234 N. Y. S. 683 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, N. Y. County, 1929).
Id. at 684.
248 N. Y. S. 98 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, N. Y. County, 1931).
7 Id. at 100-101, 102.
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not interested in the purchaser. If the stockholders not in-
terested in the purchaser are thus divided, a minority stock-
holder cannot avoid the sale as a matter of right, but only where
suitable grounds exist. Although the learned referee took proof
at great length, there was no attempt by the objecting stock-
holders to establish fraud other than to attack the adequacy of
the price paid. Proof of a price clearly inadequate might estab-
lish lack of fairness or good faith by those who controlled the
sale when the same directors acted for both parties. The deci-
sion of the referee did not include a decision of the question as
to whether the price was adequate. That appears to be the
essential question in the stockholders' action to set aside the
sale.
"The court must, in order to determine good faith, consider
the fairness of the price paid. As was said in Colby v. Equitable
Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 263, 108 N. Y. S. 978, 985, 'That
question must necessarily under the statute be determined by
the stockholders themselves, and, once their decision has been
made, in the absence of fraud or bad faith, or of facts clearly
showing that the proposed acts will be oppressive or unfair to
the corporation, the court cannot and ought not to interfere.'"
In Welt v. The Beachcomber, hnc.,7 3 the majority stock-
holders voted to dissolve the corporation, but a minority holder
obtained an injunction. Shortly before the injunction was ob-
tained, the corporation transferred all of its assets to another
corporation controlled by the majority stockholders. The court
held this transfer to be null and void, stating -:7
"That the individual defendants have in effect transferred
all the assets, including cabaret license, lease, and good will of
the defendant corporation to a new corporation practically
owned and controlled by them, is conceded. The court finds a
proper basis for plaintiff's claim that this was not done in good
faith, but for the purpose of destroying plaintiff's rights in the
defendant corporation. The defendants by so doing have caused
a de facto dissolution of the defendant corporation. People v.
Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269, 32 N. E. 54, 17 L. R. A. 737; Abbot v.
American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578; Major v. American
Malt & Grain Co., 110 Misc. 132, 181 N. Y. S. 152. The directors
may not thus, in bad faith, cause a dissolution of the corporation
as against dissenting stockholders. Godley v. Crandall & God-
ley Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818, L. R. A. 1915D, 632; Abbot v.
American Hard Rubber Co., supra."
INORTH CAROLINA
In WVhite v. Kieaid7 the directors had passed a resolution
under a North Carolina statute to the effect that they deemed it
"advisable and most for the benefit of the corporation that it
' 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 177 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, N. Y. County, 1937).
"Id. at 179-80.
; 63 S. E. 109 (N. C., 1908).
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should be dissolved." A minority stockholder sought an in-
juii-tion, but the court dismissed the bill, stating:76
"As far as North Carolina is concerned, that statute settles the
question formerly much mooted in the courts as to whether, and
under what circumstances, a corporation could be dissolved by
the stockholders, when no time was fixed for its duration, up-
holding and extending this power of voluntary dissolution as
established by the better considered decisions on the subject.
Black v. Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130-404; Treadwell v. Salisbury
MJ g. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.) 393, 66 Am. Dec. 490. This regulation
enters into every charter, subject to the provisions of the statute;
and, unless otherwise specially enacted by the Legislature, every
stockholder takes and holds his stock subject to this power of
voluntary dissolution by resolution of the directors, concurred
in by two-thirds in interest of the stockholders. This being the
law governing the interest of these parties, when the board of
directors of a corporation have determined, in the exercise of
their best judgment, that the corporation be dissolved, and are
pursuing the methods specified by the statute, it is only in rare
and exceptional instances that their action should be stayed or
interfered with by the courts. It is a principle well established
that, when a person, corporate or individual, is doing a lawful
thing in a lawful way, his conduct is not actionlble, though it
may result in damage to another; for, though the damage caused
is undoubted, no legal right of another is invaded, and hence
it is said to be damnum absque injuria. Dewey v. Railroad,
142 N. C. 392-408, 55 S. E. 292; Thomason v. Railroad (plaintiff's
appeal), 142 N. C. 318, 55 S. E. 205; Oglesby v. Attrill, 105 U. S.
605, 26 L. Ed. 1186. In such cases the motive prompting the
act, however reprehensible or malicious, is not as a rule relevant
to the inquiry; nor will courts undertake to interfere with the
honest exercise of discretionary powers vested by statute in the
management of a corporation, however unwise or improvident
it may seem. Windmuller v. Distilling Co. (C. C.) 114 Fed. 491.
";:z... if it clearly appears that the action of the management
is in bad faith; that me resolution for dissolution, for instance,
has been superinduced by fraud or undue influence, or if it
could be clearly established that this resolution was not taken
for the benefit of the corporation, or in furtherance of its inter-
est, but for the mere purpose of unjustly oppressing the minority
of the stockholders, or any of them, and causing a destruction or
sacrifice of their pecuniary interests or holdings, giving clear
indication of a breach of trust-such action could well become
the subject of judicial scrutiny and control.
"Such cases almost invariably arise when the management
of a solvent concern, going and prosperous, ceases operations
and determines to dissolve and sell out, with a view of con-
tinuing the same or similar business under different control,
and when there is indication given that the sole purpose was
to oppress some of the stockholders and confiscate their hold-
ings, or when it is done in furtherance of some scheme to pro-
mote the pecuniary interest of the actors, and to the detriment of
the corporation, giving indication of a breach of trust on the
part of the authorities in charge and control of the corporate
affairs. But no such facts are presented here."
Id. at 111.
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TEXAS
In Green v. Bennett,7 7 the majority holders voted to dis-
solve a national bank under a United States statute. A minority
holder's suit to enjoin the dissolution was dismissed on demurrer,
the court stating :Tb
"Lying at the root of appellants' case is the question of the
right of the owners of two-thirds of the shares of a National
Bank, which is in a solvent and prosperous condition, td put it
into liquidation, for the purpose of terminating its existence,
to the detriment of the interests of minority stockholders not
consenting to such liquidation.
"The only injurious consequence, claimed by appellants
to have resulted to themselves from the dissolution, is the
destruction of so much of the value of their stock as is derived
from the value of the good will of the business. That this
effect will follow is clear. By the dissolution appellants ex-
change their shares in a prosperous, dividend-paying business
for a claim in liquidation to a proportionate share in the surplus
assets, but this follows, as a necessary consequence, in all cases
of a dissolution of a solvent, dividend-paying bank, whose shares
have a value, on account of this fact, above their book value,
based upon its capital, surplus, and undivided profits, and cannot
be avoided without denying the right to liquidate a bank in a
prosperous condition, and we think this cannot be done. Once
in liquidation what appellants term the 'good will' of the bank,
no matter how valuable before the dissolution, becomes a negli-
gible quantity. The act of liquidation destroys the value of such
good will, as a value separate and apart from the value of the
tangible assets. Centralia National Bank v. Marshall, 26 Ill.
App. 440; Watkins v. National Bank, supra. In this loss in the
value of their stock all proportionately share.
"Summing up the material allegations of the petition, they
show no more than, first, that appellees refuse to continue the
business of the First National Bank, though such business is
prosperous and profitable to themselves, as well as to appellants,
but choose rather to terminate the business by liquidation under
the statute, and thus destroy so much of the value of appellants'
stock as rests upon the good will of the business of the bank as a
continuing business; and, second, that they deny to appellants
the right to share in the stock of the Yoakum National Bank.
In neither case do we think that their rights have been violated.
If, in winding up the business in liquidation, appellants, by
mismanagement, fraud, or otherwise on the part of appellees, or
the persons composing the liquidating committee, are deprived
of any part of the full amount to which they are entitled as the
value of their stock in liquidation, they have their remedy
against the persons so offending in a suit against them for such
damages. We are of the opinion that the petition shows no
cause of action, and that the general demurrer was properly
sustained."
- 110 S. W. 108 (Ct. Civ. App., Tex., 1908).
78 Id. at 115 and 117.
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WASH INGTON
In Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 79 the majority hold-
ers dissolved a corporation. The court granted an injunction to
minority holders, stating :-so
"A circumstantial review of the testimony in this case
would not be profitable, but, from an examination of all the
testimony, we are convinced beyond a doubt that the object of
the attempt to dissolve the corporation was for the purpose of
getting rid of uncongenial minority stockholders. "'::' * the
record here shows conclusively that no real cause for dissolution
existed; that the corporation was making money and prospering
in every way; and, while this would probably not be a sufficient
reason why a court should not grant the dissolution, it bears
upon the question of whether or not there was an actual intent
to disincorporate. But it is plainly stated that the object was to
get rid of a disagreeable stockholder who would not sell his
stock, Anderson testifying that the Spokane Gas Company was
formed for the purpose of taking over the gas plant. It is ap-
parent that, if the respondents could have purchased appellant's
stock, the disincorporation would not have been thought of.
The practice is one which is frequently indulged in for the pur-
pose of what is described in vulgar phrase as 'freezing out'
small stockholders; a compliance with the letter instead of the
spirit of the statute; a pernicious practice, which courts of
equity cannot too promptly condemn."
In BIhutelspaclar v. Spokane Savings Batik,"' the majority
stokholders dissolved a corporation and turned its assets over
to a new corporation in order to avoid a state taxing statute. A
minority stockholder brought suit to have the transfer of the
assets to the new corporation declared illegal and void. The
,ourt dismissed the action, stating :
'2
"This case differs from that of Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas
Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004, where it was held that an
attempted dissolution of a prosperous corporation and the trans-
fer of its assets to a new corporation, for the sole purpose of
getting rid of a disagreeable stockholder who refused to sell
his stock, could not be sustained. In this case the evidence
shows clearly that the officers and directors of the Spokane Sav-
ings & Loan Society, in taking the action that they did with
reference to the society and with reference to the bank, were
actuated by an honest and sincere desire to promote the interests
of the shareholders of the society. The trial court, in a memo-
randum opinion filed after the trial, said: 'I am convinced from
the evidence that the officers and directors of the Spokane Sav-
ings & Loan Society, in taking the action that they did with
reference to said Society and with reference to the Spokane
Savings Bank, were actuated by an earnest desire and sincere
'74 Pac. 1004 (Wash., 1904).
'Id. at 1005 and 1006.
"2 P. (2d) 729 (Wash., 1931).
"Id. at 730 and 731.
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motive to advance and promote the best interests of the share-
holders of the savings and loan institution. * * ' "
"Where the statute gives authority to dissolve a corporation,
and the requisite number of shareholders supports the resolution
for dissolution and liquidation, the courts will not examine into
the affairs of the corporation for the purpose of determining
whether the action was expedient or wise."
CONCLUSION
The leading cases reviewed above indicate that the courts
will permit majority stockholders to dissolve a profitable corpo-
ration according to statute and that minority holders can pre-
vent dissolution only in cases where there is (1) fraud43 or (2) a
"freezing out" of minority holders with the purpose of contin-
uing the business for the benefit of the majority holders,A4 or (3)
where the dissolution is, in actual effect a consolidation of two
or more corporations contrary to law,, 5 or (4) a sale of assets to
the majority holders for an inadequate price. 11,
See Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., note 65 supra; Welt
v. The Beachcomber, Inc., note 73 supra.
See Lebold v. Inland Steamship Co., note 27 supra; Kavanaugh
v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., note 65 supra; Major v. American Malt
& Grain Co., note 67 supra; Welt v. The Beachcomber, Inc., note 73
supra; Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., note 79 supra.
I See In Re Doe Run Lead Co., note 38 supra; William B. Ricker
& Son Co. v. United Drug Co., note 50 supra; Ervin v. Oregon Ry. &
Nay. Co., note 56 supra.
' See Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation v. Steel & Tube Co. of
America, note 23 supra; Major v American Malt & Grain Co., note 67
supra; In re American Telegraph & Cable Co., note 71 supra.
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